The Constitutional Status of the Supreme Court of Canada by Newman, Warren J.
The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 47 (2009) Article 15
The Constitutional Status of the Supreme Court of
Canada
Warren J. Newman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Newman, Warren J.. "The Constitutional Status of the Supreme Court of Canada." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference 47. (2009).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol47/iss1/15
The Constitutional Status of the 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Warren J. Newman

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Canada stands at the apex of the judicial 
system in this country.
1
 The Supreme Court is the head of the judicial 
branch of government and the final arbiter of legal disputes. Its authority 
is paramount in the interpretation of law, and particularly, the supreme 
law, the Constitution of Canada. It is, as Professor Stephen Scott has 
emphasized, “an institution of inestimable significance. So too, therefore, 
is the law dealing with the Court‟s constitution, organization and 
jurisdiction”.2  
However, unlike the Parliament of Canada, which was established by 
the Constitution Act, 1867,
3
 the Supreme Court was not created by the 
Constitution of Canada; only its eventual existence was contemplated by 
that Act. Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 granted to Parliament 
the power to provide for the “Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization” 
of what was termed “a General Court of Appeal for Canada”, as well as 
for the establishment of additional courts “for the better Administration 
                                                                                                             
 Dip.C.S., B.A., B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill), LL.M. (Osgoode); Ad. E.; of the Bars of Quebec 
and Ontario; Senior General Counsel, Constitutional and Administrative Law Section, Department 
of Justice of Canada. The views expressed in this paper are meant to stimulate reflection and debate, 
in the context of an academic conference. They do not necessarily represent the position of the 
Department of Justice or the Government of Canada.  
1  For discussion, see “The Supreme Court of Canada and the Canadian Court System”, in 
W.J. Newman, “Adjudicating Divisions of Powers Issues: a Canadian Perspective”, in Andrew Le 
Sueur, ed., Building the UK’s New Supreme Court — National and Comparative Perspectives 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 115-44; an earlier version of that chapter was published 
as a paper in (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) at 139-79. 
2  S.A. Scott, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the 1987 Constitutional Accord”, in Réal-
A. Forest, ed., L’adhésion du Québec à l’Accord du Lac Meech – Points de vue juridiques et 
politiques (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 1987), at 131.  
3  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3; see s. 17 et seq. of Part IV of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
under the rubric, “Legislative Power”.  
430 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
of the Laws of Canada”. In 1875, Parliament proceeded by statute to 
establish the Supreme Court.
4
 
What, if any, is the constitutional status of the Supreme Court of 
Canada? Professor Peter W. Hogg, in his oft-cited treatise, Constitutional 
Law of Canada, states that Canadians did not write into the British North 
America Act
5
 “a new supreme court on the model of the Supreme Court 
of the United States. The B.N.A. Act, by section 101, gave authority for 
such a court to be established, but did not actually establish it.”6  
Yet is the position of the United States Supreme Court so entirely 
different? Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 may be compared 
and contrasted with Article 1, section 1 of the Constitution of the United 
States, which provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The Supreme 
Court of the United States was effectively established by Congress 
through the Judiciary Act of 1789,
7
 and the composition of the Court was 
varied by Congress in 1807, 1837, 1863 and 1869.
8
 
The comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court, although not a perfect 
analogy,
9
 is a useful one because it opens the door to a way of thinking 
about the Supreme Court of Canada that may assist us in reconciling 
Parliament‟s ongoing power to enact laws — most notably the Supreme 
Court Act
10
 itself and amendments thereto — in relation to the Court, 
while at the same time acknowledging the Court‟s pre-eminent role and 
position in our judicial system and constitutional framework. 
                                                                                                             
4  Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, S.C. 1875, c. 11. 
5  Now styled the Constitution Act, 1867, by the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
6  P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 
2007), ch. 1.2, at 5 [hereinafter “Hogg, Constitutional Law ”]. 
7  An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 (enacted by 
Congress on September 24, 1789), provided in s. 1 that “the supreme court of the United States shall 
consist of a chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom shall be a quorum, and shall 
hold annually at the seat of government two sessions, the one commencing the first Monday of 
February, and the other the first Monday of August. …” 
8  The number of Justices was increased from six to seven, then nine, ten, and back to nine; 
the latter by the Judiciary Act of 1869.  
9  More of the U.S. Supreme Court‟s elements, such as the nomination and appointments 
process and judicial tenure are formally entrenched in the Constitution. Another analogy (also 
imperfect) is that of the High Court of Australia, in which the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
of Australia was vested by the Constitution of 1901, but which was actually established by the 
Judiciary Act 1903 enacted by the Parliament of Australia.  
10  R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT ACT AND THE CONUNDRUM OF THE 
AMENDING PROCEDURES 
The Supreme Court Act is not one of the Acts listed in the schedule 
to the Constitution Act, 1982 and thereby defined, through section 52 of 
the latter Act, as forming part of the Constitution of Canada. The 
Supreme Court Act was amended in 1987 by an ordinary statute of 
Parliament despite the fact, as Professor Hogg points out, that “the 
Supreme Court of Canada” is one of the matters expressly listed in 
section 42 of the Constitution Act, 1982 as being subject to the general 
amending procedure of section 38 (requiring authorizing resolutions of the 
Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislative assemblies of two-
thirds of the provinces representing 50 per cent of the population of the 
provinces).
11
 This is because, as Hogg underlines, unlike the other 
matters dealt with in section 42, the Supreme Court is “nowhere provided 
for in the Constitution of Canada”.12 Section 42 only applies to 
amendments to the Constitution of Canada, and since the Supreme Court 
Act is not one of the instruments forming part of the Constitution, it 
follows that the Act is still open to ordinary amendment by Parliament 
under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. So too, section 41 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 subjects amendments to the Constitution of 
Canada in relation to “the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada” 
to the unanimity procedure (the approval of the federal Houses and all 10 
legislative assemblies), but since amendments to the Supreme Court Act 
are not amendments to the Constitution of Canada, it is open to 
Parliament to alter the current composition of the Court, as it has done 
from time to time in the past: 
The amending Act of 1987 did not change the number of judges on the 
Court or the requirement that three judges must be appointed from 
Quebec, but these are matters provided in the Supreme Court Act, not 
the Constitution of Canada, so they too are open to amendment by the 
ordinary legislative process, despite the fact that “the composition of 
the Supreme Court of Canada” is one of the topics listed in s. 41 as 
requiring the unanimity procedure.
13
  
Later in his treatise, Professor Hogg reiterates that the Court was 
established by Parliament and that thus “[t]he Supreme Court‟s existence, 
                                                                                                             
11  Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra, note 6, ch. 4.2(c), at 78.  
12  Id., 4.3(g), at 85. 
13  Id., at 4.2(c). 
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and therefore the details of its composition and jurisdiction, depend upon 
an ordinary federal statute.”14 He adds: “In theory, the Court could be 
abolished by the unilateral action of the federal Parliament.”15 
As for the procedures for constitutional amendment set out in Part V 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, they appear on their face to do no more 
and no less than to provide the means by which the composition 
(paragraph 41(d)) and other elements (paragraph 42(1)(d)) of the 
Supreme Court may be dealt with in the Constitution of Canada, and this 
was certainly the premise of the 1987 Meech Lake and the 1992 
Charlottetown Constitutional Accords. Professor Hogg has emphasized 
that because of the difficulty of reaching agreement on aspects such as a 
provincial role in judicial appointments, “the entrenchment of the Court 
was not included in the constitutional proposals that were placed before 
the federal Parliament by Prime Minister Trudeau in October 1980 and 
the entrenchment of the Court was not included in the settlement that was 
approved by all first ministers except for the Premier of Quebec in 
November 1981”; the result being that the Constitution Act, 1982 did not 
entrench the Supreme Court in the Constitution.
16
 However, noted 
Professor Scott, writing in 1982, “[t]o argue that none of the federal 
statute law dealing with the Supreme Court of Canada forms part of the 
„Constitution of Canada‟ is to say, in effect, that Parliament may 
continue to legislate on the subject exactly as it pleases, and its power 
under section 101 to do so cannot be taken away save by the elaborate 
methods” set out in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. “This”, he 
continued, “can scarcely have been what the eight „opposing‟ premiers 
had in mind when they signed their „April Accord‟ from which sections 
41(d) and 42(1)(d) were taken.”17 Writing five years later, Professor 
Hogg declared: 
The references to the Supreme Court of Canada in ss. 41(d) and 
42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 have created an intolerably 
                                                                                                             
14  Id., ch. 8.1, at 240. 
15  Id.; that statement is tempered in two respects: in a footnote, Professor Hogg adverts to 
the possibility that “references to the Supreme Court of Canada in ss. 41(d) and 42[1](d) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 have now placed the Court beyond the power of the federal Parliament” (but 
this eventuality is discussed and dismissed in his text in Chapter 4) and he continues in the body of 
his treatise: “In practice, of course, the Court has won a highly respected place in the scheme of 
Canadian government, and no federal government would ever contemplate the abolition or 
diminution of the Court.” 
16  P.W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated (Scarborough: Carswell, 
1987), at 29-30 [hereinafter “Hogg, Meech Lake”].  
17  S.A. Scott, “The Canadian Constitutional Amendment Processes” (1982) 45 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 249, at 261 [hereinafter “Scott, Constitutional Amendment”]. 
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confusing situation. While it is probable that these references are 
ineffective as long as the Court is not provided for in the Constitution 
of Canada, this is by no means clear; and it is possible that the Supreme 
Court Act, or some as yet identified parts of the Supreme Court Act, 
cannot now be amended by the ordinary legislative process. The 
situation cries out for clarification, and clarification has now been 
provided by the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord.
18
  
Professor Patrick Monahan, in his own textbook, Constitutional 
Law,
19
 takes exception to the view expressed by Professor Hogg, arguing 
that it would render paragraph 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
“completely ineffective in terms of protecting provincial interests” in 
relation to the Supreme Court.
20
 Monahan argues that a contextual and 
purposive interpretation would “support the conclusion that section 
42(1)(d) must operate so as to limit, in some fashion, the ability of the 
federal Parliament to effect changes to the Supreme Court of Canada 
without the consent of the provinces”.21 In attempting to determine the 
nature and scope of such limits, he adverts to Professor Stephen Scott‟s 
observation that the Supreme Court Act and the Rules adopted pursuant 
to it deal with such minutiae as the colour of the covers of the parties‟ 
factums.
22
 Monahan suggests a “middle ground” between rendering 
paragraph 42(1)(d) “nugatory”, and construing that provision as having 
constitutionally entrenched every minor detail and measure set out in the 
Supreme Court Act and Rules. Invoking the Supreme Court‟s own 
analysis in protecting the “fundamental features and key characteristics” 
of the Senate from alteration by Parliament in the Upper House 
Reference,
23
 Monahan would see paragraph 42(1)(d) as having entrenched 
                                                                                                             
18  Hogg, Meech Lake, supra, note 16, at 30. 
19  P.J. Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) [hereinafter 
“Monahan”]. 
20  Id., at 193. He continues: “Indeed, the result of Hogg‟s analysis is that Parliament‟s 
unilateral power to make fundamental changes to the Court‟s powers or composition cannot be 
constrained in the future unless at least seven, and perhaps all ten, provinces agree.”  
21  Id., at 194. 
22  S.A. Scott, “Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and the New Constitutional Amendment 
Processes” (1982) 20 U.W.O. L. Rev. 247, at 272; see also Scott, “Constitutional Amendment”, 
supra, note 17, at 262: Professor Scott argued that  
The Supreme Court of Canada will likely be disposed to adopt an intermediate position, 
attributing to some of the federal statutory provisions a „constitutional‟ character, and to 
others not. This would give an entrenched status to the essential elements of the court‟s 
character, without involving the inconvenience which an implied repeal of the pertinent 
portion of section 101 would entail.  
23  Re Authority of Parliament in relation to the Upper House, [1979] S.C.J. No. 94, [1980] 
1 S.C.R. 54 (S.C.C.). 
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“only those key characteristics of the Court that implicate fundamental 
provincial interests”.24 
Such key characteristics would include the status of the Court as a 
general court of appeal for Canada and a superior court of record; the 
number of judges of the Court; the requirement that three members of 
the Court be appointed from the bar of Quebec; and the mode of 
appointment, tenure, and removal of its judges.
25
 
Professor Monahan provides further criticism of the anomalies 
produced by the view expressed by Professor Hogg that the list of 
instruments entrenched as part of the Constitution of Canada through 
subsection 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (and the schedule thereto) 
is a closed one. Treating subsection 52(2) as exhaustive of the meaning 
of the term, “[t]he Constitution of Canada”, for the purposes of that 
section (supremacy and entrenchment) also means that the Supreme 
Court Act does not come within the definition of the Constitution of 
Canada and therefore, paragraph 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
leaves unprotected from further legislative change the provisions of the 
Supreme Court Act that currently provide that three of the nine judges of 
the Court must come from the Bar of Quebec. 
For example, Quebec‟s guaranteed representation on the Supreme 
Court could be eliminated without its consent, through an ordinary 
statute passed by the Parliament of Canada. Moreover, the only way 
that Quebec could obtain constitutional protection against this kind of 
unilateral federal change in its Supreme Court representation would be 
to obtain the agreement of all the other provinces.
26
 
Professor Monahan calls this result “doubly anomalous” when 
analyzed in light of the protections afforded by the Part V amending 
procedures taken as a whole, and what he sees as the basic purpose of the 
procedures: 
The underlying purpose of the amending procedure, in other words, is 
to protect the provinces from having their rights or privileges 
negatively affected without their consent. This includes provincial 
interests in the design and operation of key national institutions such as 
the Senate and the House of Commons. Yet, by treating section 41(d) 
as ineffective, the provinces are granted absolutely no protection when 
it comes to the Supreme Court, a key institution of the federation. In 
                                                                                                             
24  Monahan, supra, note 19, at 194. 
25  Id. 
26  Id., at 181. 
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my view, this interpretation is inconsistent with the underlying purpose 
of Part V.
27
 
Professors Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay and Eugénie Brouillet invoke 
a similar construction of the Part V amending procedures when it comes 
to the meaning to be attributed to paragraph 41(d): 
Il est possible d‟imaginer que l‟article 41d) n‟ait voulu imposer 
l‟unanimité qu‟à d‟éventuels ajouts à la Constitution du Canada portant 
sur la composition de la Cour suprême, sans prétendre régir sa 
composition actuelle résultant de la Loi sur la Cour suprême. Cette 
vision des choses nous semble toutefois pas celle qu‟il faille privilégier, 
pour la raison essentielle qu‟elle équivaut à protéger la compétence 
fédérale exclusive de régir à sa guise la composition de la Cour 
suprême. Le Québec, en particulier, n‟a pas pu vouloir cela lorsqu‟il a 
consenti à la formule en question en avril 1981; la présence de trois 
juges civilistes sur neuf à la Cour suprême lui est trop importante. Plus 
généralement, il semble certain que l‟intention des divers acteurs 
politiques à l‟époque du rapatriement ne se situait pas à un deuxième 
degré d‟abstraction et qu‟elle consistait bien à enchâsser la composition 
de la Cour suprême.
28
 
This view of the purpose of paragraph 41(d) (and 42(1)(d)) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 — a view informed (if not coloured) by 
considerations of appropriate policy outcomes (i.e., achieving 
constitutional protection for the judges from Quebec) — must be 
balanced with the fact that both before and after 1982, attempts to 
entrench substantively the composition and essential characteristics of 
the Supreme Court in the Constitution of Canada were proposed and 
failed to be ratified. Indeed, one of the government of Quebec‟s five 
basic constitutional demands after 1982 was the entrenchment of the 
                                                                                                             
27  Id. 
28  H. Brun, G. Tremblay & E. Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5th ed. (Cowansville: 
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), at 233-34. Professor Benoît Pelletier, in his major study of the amending 
procedures, La modification constitutionnelle au Canada (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996), at 74, sides 
with Hogg: “nous partageons l‟opinion du professeur Hogg […] et estimons que le terme 
« Constitution du Canada » à l‟article 52 de la Loi de 1982 ne doit couvrir que les textes figurant à 
l‟annexe de cette loi.” Statutes that are not listed in the schedule, such as the Supreme Court Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 and the Official Languages Act, S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.), “ne doivent pas 
être considérés comme faisant partie de la Constitution du Canada pour les fins de la procédure e 
modification constitutionnelle établie dans la Partie V de la Loi de 1982, et ce, ni en totalité ni en 
partie”. He adds (in fn. 229, at 75): “Nous ne partageons donc pas l‟opinion des auteurs Brun et 
Tremblay, […] voulant que certaines des dispositions de la Loi sur la Cour suprême soient soumises 
à la Partie V de la Loi de 1982 alors que d‟autres ne le seraient pas. Une telle position, en effet, 
ajoute inutilement de l‟incertitude à la question de savoir comment cette loi pourra être modifiée 
dans l‟avenir.” 
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Court‟s composition as respects the judges from Quebec. The 1987 
Meech Lake Constitutional Accord would have amended the 
Constitution Act, 1867 to provide, immediately after section 101 thereof, 
new sections 101A to 101E. Section 101A would have expressly 
continued and constituted the Court; section 101B would have 
determined the qualifications of persons who may be appointed judges, 
and would have required that at least three judges come from Quebec; 
section 101C would have provided for the appointment process; section 
101D would have applied sections 99 and 100 (dealing with tenure and 
salaries, etc.) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to the judges of the Supreme 
Court; and section 101E would have preserved the power of Parliament 
to make laws under section 101, subject to the provisions of sections 
101A to 101D. 
In light of the failure of the ratification of the Meech Lake Accord‟s 
constitutional amendments under section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
and other attempts to amend the Constitution to provide expressly for the 
Supreme Court‟s composition, organization and maintenance,29 it is 
difficult to believe that the Court would, under the guise of judicial 
interpretation, be prepared to read these types of provisions directly into 
the text of the Constitution.  
III. FOCUSING UPON THE COURT RATHER THAN THE  
SUPREME COURT ACT OR THE AMENDING PROCEDURES  
That said, it is unnecessary, in the context of the present paper, to 
come to a definitive view on whether the Supreme Court Act, the 
Supreme Court and its composition or other basic characteristics of the 
Court have been entrenched through sections 41 and 42 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. There has been no formal judicial consideration 
of the effect of paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 
1982 in any case law to date, so purportedly definitive pronouncements 
in this unsettled area should be treated with caution. It may well be that, 
whatever the differences of scholars as to details and approach in terms 
of the extent to which (if at all) the Supreme Court Act or its basic 
principles and provisions have been entrenched, the Supreme Court itself 
is now beyond the reach of abolition by Parliament under section 101 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867. The fact that there is no longer a higher (or 
                                                                                                             
29  See also the provisions of the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, which would have made 
similar amendments in relation to s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
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alternative) court of appeal in the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council; the emerging doctrine of the separation of powers as a 
fundamental constitutional principle, even in a parliamentary system of 
government; the central, structural role played by the Court as the 
general court of appeal for Canada; its pivotal place in the judicial 
hierarchy; and the very mention of the Court in sections 41 and 42 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, all argue for its continued constitutional 
existence despite the plenary character of the legislative power conferred 
upon Parliament under section 101 of the Act of 1867.  
The views exemplified by Professors Hogg and Monahan, 
respectively, each have some merit. However, in their focus on the status 
of the Supreme Court Act, on the one hand, and the constitutional 
amending procedures on the other, they also tend to lead to unwanted 
consequences. The view that it is open to Parliament, as a matter of law, 
to repeal the Supreme Court Act and thereby to abolish the Court, begs a 
legal response asserting that the Constitution cannot permit the 
legislature to interfere so drastically in the judicial sphere.
30
 On the other 
hand, the view that the constitutional amending procedures are nugatory 
in their effect if they have not entrenched either the Supreme Court Act, 
or else the principal characteristics of the Court, belies the use (or 
contemplation) of those procedures in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
Constitutional Accords, and may also constrain the flexibility of 
Parliament‟s power to modernize and improve the Supreme Court Act 
and the characteristics of the Court without resorting to complex 
constitutional amendments.  
Most constitutional scholars would now concede the point that the 
Supreme Court Act — albeit in many respects an organic instrument and 
“constitutional” in the broad sense described by Beetz J. in the 
O.P.S.E.U. case (i.e., bearing upon an organ or principle of government) 
— is not itself part of the “Constitution of Canada” as that term is 
defined in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
31
 Professor Hogg‟s 
point on this score is well taken. Furthermore, most scholars (with some 
                                                                                                             
30  “It is well within the power of the legislature to enact laws, even laws which some would 
consider draconian, as long as it does not fundamentally alter or interfere with the relationship 
between the courts and the other branches of government”: Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 57 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C. 
31  O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 
(S.C.C.); see also W.J. Newman, “Defining the Constitution of Canada Since 1982” (2003) 22 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 423. 
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notable exceptions
32
) would also be reluctant to recommend that the 
courts read the Supreme Court Act into the apparently closed list of Acts 
and instruments scheduled to the Constitution Act, 1982 — the term 
“includes” in subsection 52(2) being unlikely to overcome, in this 
regard, the stricture against unauthorized constitutional amendment by 
(inter alia) robust judicial construction embodied in subsection 52(3): 
“Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in 
accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.”33 
However, if it may be difficult to deny the proposition that the 
Supreme Court Act is not itself part of the Constitution of Canada in the 
formal sense and is therefore neither supreme law nor constitutionally 
entrenched, there would seem to be something inherently unsatisfactory, 
from the standpoint of the rule of law and other fundamental 
constitutional principles, with the corollary advanced earlier by Professor 
Hogg: that if the Supreme Court Act is itself not part of the Constitution 
of Canada, then in the fullness of legal theory, the Parliament of Canada 
has the legislative competence to abolish the Supreme Court — and 
thereby, to eliminate the central organ exercising supreme judicial 
power.  
                                                                                                             
32  Incorporating the Supreme Court Act (or parts thereof) into the Constitution by analytical 
construction or judicial interpretation has been contemplated by S.A. Scott (see supra, note 22) but 
also by R.I. Cheffins, in “The Constitution Act, 1982 and the Amending Formula: Political and 
Legal Implications” (1982) 4 S.C.L.R. 43, at 53-54; see also W.R. Lederman, “Constitutional 
Procedure and the Return of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1985) 26 Cahiers de droit. These early 
writings pre-date the Supreme Court‟s consideration of the meaning of s. 52(2) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 in New Brunswick Broadcasting, infra, note 33. 
33  In New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 2, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 (S.C.C.), a majority of the Court refused to treat article 9 of 
the English Bill of Rights of 1689 as itself part of the Constitution of Canada, but did accept that the 
principle of parliamentary privilege embodied in that provision became part of the Constitution via 
the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and its reference to Canada possessing “a Constitution 
similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”. Stated McLachlin J. (as she then was), at 378:  
I accept the spirit of the remarks of Hogg that additions to the 30 instruments set out in 
the Schedule to s. 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 might have grave consequences 
given the supremacy and entrenchment that is provided for the “Constitution of Canada” 
in ss. 52(1) and 52(3). However, as Hogg himself concedes, s. 52(2) is not clearly meant 
to be exhaustive. That established, I would be unwilling to restrict the interpretation of 
that section in such a way as to preclude giving effect to the intention behind the 
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, thereby denying recognition to the minimal, but 
long recognized and essential, inherent privileges of Canadian legislative bodies. 
A similar result was achieved by Lamer C.J.C. in relation to the Act of Settlement of 1701 in 
Reference re Provincial Court Judges, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); the 
principle of judicial independence (rather than the provisions of the Act of Settlement) was part of the 
Constitution of Canada, through the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. 
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It is true that Canada got along without a Supreme Court for almost a 
decade after Confederation, and that the Court did not truly become 
supreme until after the abolition, by Parliament, of appeals to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom.
34
 However, 
the obvious point is precisely that: the supreme appellate function of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was an integral part of the 
Canadian judicial system until it was ultimately displaced by the 
Parliament of Canada in favour of the Supreme Court. Canadians could 
do without a general court of appeal for Canada as long as the Judicial 
Committee continued to play that role. With the abolition of appeals to 
the Privy Council, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
Canada became essential.  
Structural constitutional principles militate in favour of that conclusion. 
Canada‟s constitution is primarily a written one, as is typical of a federal 
state, where legislative (and executive) powers must be allocated among 
the central and local governments. It is generally conceded that the 
resolution of legal disputes between governments in respect of the 
division of powers requires an impartial and authoritative judicial 
arbiter.
35
 That judicial role has been enhanced since 1982 by the 
entrenchment of a constitutional bill of rights and by the express (in the 
judicial remedies clause of section 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms)
36
 and implied (in the supremacy clause in section 52 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982) responsibilities imposed thereby on the courts 
as guarantors of constitutional interests and protections. 
Moreover, the development of the Supreme Court‟s own understanding 
of the basic tenets underlying the written provisions of the Constitution: 
— first principles such as federalism; the separation of powers among 
                                                                                                             
34  Appeals in criminal cases were abolished by the Parliament of Canada in 1933 and in 
civil cases in 1949. For the jurisprudence relating to the validity of the abolition statutes, see R. v. 
Nadan, [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.), R. v. British Coal Corp., [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.); Ontario (Attorney 
General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.). 
35  No less eminent a legal scholar than A.V. Dicey observed, in his Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan & Co., 1889), at 157: “For the essential 
characteristics of federalism — the supremacy of the constitution — the distribution of powers — 
the authority of the judiciary — reappear, though no doubt with modifications, in every true federal 
state.” Calling the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council “the true Supreme Court of the 
Dominion”, Dicey continued: “In Canada, as in the United States, the Courts inevitably become the 
interpreters of the Constitution.” For contemporary scholarship, consider Donna Greschner, “The 
Supreme Court, Federalism, and Metaphors of Moderation” (2001) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 47; A. Wayne 
MacKay, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Federalism: Does / Should Anyone Care Anymore?” 
(2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241; and Bruce Ryder, “The End of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial 
Restraint” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345. 
36  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 5. 
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the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government; judicial 
independence; and constitutionalism itself — lend further support to the 
idea that a supreme court is necessary to ensure respect for, and the 
fulfilment of, core constitutional values and ideals. 
IV. CONSTRUING SECTION 101 OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 
AND THE STATUS OF THE COURT 
How do these principles relate, in the context of the question of the 
constitutional status of the Supreme Court, to another basic constitutional 
principle: parliamentary sovereignty? Principles such as the rule of law 
cannot normally negate the validity of statutes enacted by Parliament or a 
provincial legislature, respectively, pursuant to a constitutional grant of 
legislative power under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 
1867.
37
 Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is itself a plenary and 
continuing grant of legislative power: the Parliament of Canada “may, 
notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the 
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of 
Appeal for Canada”, as well as for the establishment of additional courts 
for the “better Administration of the Laws of Canada”. Section 101 
clearly provides (“notwithstanding anything in this Act”) for an ongoing 
legislative role (Parliament may legislate “from Time to Time”) in 
relation to the Supreme Court, just as the Congress of the United States 
has made provision, from time to time, for matters relating to the 
Supreme Court of the United States — but it may be argued plausibly 
that the thrust of section 101 is to grant Parliament the power to 
establish, and thereafter to maintain, a general appellate court for 
Canada. In other words, section 101 — on its own terms (“Constitution, 
Maintenance, and Organization”) and read in light of structural 
constitutional principles (federalism, constitutionalism, the separation of 
powers and an independent judiciary) as well as recent constitutional 
history (the entrenchment of a Charter of Rights, an express supremacy 
clause, and comprehensive amending procedures) — does not give rise 
to a legislative power on the part of Parliament to abolish the Supreme 
Court or to diminish its status as a general court of appeal for Canada or 
— in light of the express mention of the term, “Supreme Court of 
                                                                                                             
37  See W.J. Newman, “The Principles of the Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty in 
Constitutional Theory and Litigation” (2005) 16 N.J.C.L. 175; P.W. Hogg & C.R. Zwibel, “The 
Rule of Law in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 715. 
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Canada” in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, its status and core 
attributes as the supreme court of the country. 
A progressive and purposive construction of section 101 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 in relation to the essential role played by the 
Supreme Court as the pre-eminent judicial institution in our constitutional 
system of government, would avoid many of the problems encountered 
by focusing the debate about the status of the Court on whether the 
Supreme Court Act is itself part of the Constitution of Canada and 
whether paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
have themselves entrenched the Court and its composition. It would 
permit the Parliament of Canada to continue to exercise an important and 
practical legislative function in modernizing and protecting elements of 
the Court by statute from time to time, while leaving to the amending 
procedures further express and entrenched constitutional enhancements 
and protections.  
On this theory, the baseline of what a “General Court of Appeal for 
Canada” consists of will have been crystallized by the express mention 
of “the Supreme Court of Canada” in the Part V amending procedures of 
the Constitution Act, 1982: in other words, the essential attributes of the 
Supreme Court as they existed in 1982. On the delicate question of the 
composition of the Court, this view would include among those essential 
characteristics the continuing presence of three judges drawn from the 
bench and bar of Quebec, given their significance to the recognition of 
the civil law tradition in Canada and, more broadly, to Canadian 
federalism and diversity. A further statutory enhancement by Parliament 
— such as, for instance, a recognition in law of what is now the practice: 
that three of the other nine judges are appointed from the bench and bar 
of Ontario, one from the Atlantic provinces and two from the Western 
provinces — might also be permissible, as might (although this could be 
argued either way) an increase in the total number of judges.
38
 
Construing section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 as protecting 
the constitution, maintenance and organization of the Supreme Court as a 
                                                                                                             
38  Quaere whether a Private Member‟s Bill currently under study before the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Bill C-232, An Act to amend the 
Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages) relates indirectly to the composition of the 
Court, or simply imposes a further condition precedent on potential nominees to the bench. The Bill 
would amend s. 5 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26 so as to provide, in addition to the 
current requirement that “[a]ny person may be appointed a judge who is or has been a judge of a 
superior court of a province or a barrister or advocate of at least ten years standing at the bar of a 
province” (which would become s. 5(1)), “any person referred to in subsection (1) may be appointed 
a judge who understands French or English without the assistance of an interpreter.”  
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general and supreme appellate court for Canada, while permitting 
Parliament to continue to enact amendments to the Supreme Court Act 
from time to time to modernize and enhance the functions, attributes and 
administration of the Court, in keeping with its essential role and status, 
would respect the principle of the separation of powers and would also 
leave the amending procedures of paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 to the task of formal and express constitutional 
amendment of the type contemplated by the Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
Accords. This would also maintain the integrity of those formal processes 
of constitutional amendment, which impose strict requirements for 
ratification by the federal legislative houses and the provincial legislative 
assemblies.
39
  
On a liberal application of this theory, it might still be open to an 
aggressively minded Parliament to abrogate the provisions of the 
Supreme Court Act; however, such repeal would be not only ill 
considered but a vexatious exercise in futility, because it would be 
ineffective to abolish the Court itself. On a stricter view, Parliament‟s 
legislative power under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is 
limited to establishing and maintaining a general court of appeal for 
Canada, and, at least since 1982, is to be exercised in a manner consistent 
with the basic attributes of the Supreme Court of Canada as that institution 
stood then constituted, although it remains within the competence of 
Parliament to adjust the framework legislation and the administrative 
and regulatory details governing the organization of the Court from time 
to time. 
It is well to note that even the Mother of Parliaments, the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, has, through the enactment of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005, provided for the establishment of a Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom.
40
 It joins, in this respect, the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand established by the Parliament of that dominion in 2004.
41
 
There is good reason to believe that modern constitutionalism — 
particularly in a federal state with a largely written constitution, such as 
                                                                                                             
39  The amending procedures serve a dual purpose: to permit constitutional amendments 
where the legal requirements of the formulae have been met, through the authorizing resolutions of 
the relevant federal legislative chambers and provincial assemblies; (2) to protect constitutional 
guarantees and entrenched provisions from change where the requisite conditions of Part V have not 
been met: W.J. Newman, “Living with the Amending Procedures: Prospects for Future 
Constitutional Reform in Canada” (2007) 37 S.C.L.R. (2d) 383, at 385-86. 
40  2005, c. 4 (U.K.); see esp. Part 3 of the Act. The U.K. Supreme Court will become 
operational in October 2009. 
41  Supreme Court Act 2003 (N.Z.), which came into force on January 1, 2004.  
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Canada and the United States — contemplates the continued existence 
and vitality of a supreme judicial institution and appellate court. 
Interpreting section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 in keeping with 
that end is one means of ensuring that objective. 
 
